Abstract
In media, as well as in broader society, the focus on emotions is usually associated with women and it seems to be at odds with other prevailing believes on the value of detachment and reason as key to an ethical public sphere that informs rational citizens. Yet, emotions have always been an important part of news narratives. In our paper, we seek to untangle reason and emotion in the production of news as we recall the historical and contemporary gender dimension of its production. Also, looking into the pragmatic challenge to dispassionate ethics we argue that one way of discerning on what makes ethical and compelling news is not necessarily the separation of these two dimensions, but the inclusion of the insights from a feminist ethics of care.

Keywords
Gender, news, emotion, pragmatism, ethics of care

1. Introduction
In a back edition of a newspaper we read the following news piece:

The son had just got married and was still celebrating his wedding when he was informed of the death of his mother. He ran home, but his father had already fatally stabbed the wife, age 46, presumably after a jealous rage (...). That was the tragic end to the marriage day celebration of the only child of the couple (...). The suspect, in his 50s, publically consummated the fatal assault, allegedly because he suspected that his wife, who had left him a month ago, betrayed him¹.

¹ Diário de Notícias, 29th August, 2011, online edition. The headline read: “Tragedy. Killed his wife on the same day his son got married” (Tragédia. Matou a mulher no dia em que o filho se casou).
As we read this story, we cannot help feeling touched by the young man’s tragic feelings on learning of his mother’s murder by his father on his wedding day. We might even feel the father’s desperation and jealousy about his wife’s alleged affairs, leading him to a “crime of passion”. More than simply informing us of (some) the facts of an occurring tragedy, the story details directly speaks to our emotions. In that respect, it is in line with many other news accounts which also obsessively portray and appeal to our emotions.

But did our news story speak to the reporter’s own emotions this being the reason why he framed it as such? We cannot know. All we know is this: at some point, someone made the decision that the story made sense from a rational journalistic point of view. And this may have been justified as follows: it was factual, it was unusual in many respects, it involved murder, it was part of the day’s occurrences – it was, in other words, an occurrence “fit to print”. But in deciding this, the journalist also chose to frame the story not from an angle that focused on the murder of a wife but from the viewpoint of the different emotional states of the victim’s living relatives. Here then, we have both emotions and rational decisions conflating in the production of this news narrative. Furthermore, when we analyze it from this viewpoint, a gender issue comes to the fore, as we will later argue.

Starting from this news as an example of the kind of narrative that fills our information sphere, we try to untangle reason and emotion in the production of news and we argue that one way of discerning on what makes an ethical and compelling news piece is not necessarily the separation of these two dimensions, but the inclusion of the insights from an ethics of care.

2. Emotion at the service of news

Crimes, tragedies, natural and manmade disasters and other catastrophes are good subjects for news stories in that they provide human interest and crucial drama which, when incorporated into the narrative, make them particularly attractive and popular. Indeed we may also look at our news story from a news genre perspective, recognizing in it features of the so-called “human interest story”. Writing in 1940, Helen McGill Hughes (1981) noted that human interest stories have a ‘perennial’ interest for the readers. She never actually gave a formal definition of the term, but she referred to stories having a “human angle” which appealed to “the city demos”. Hughes, quoting Hearst, noted that they may be considered interesting news in that they attract the mass public as opposed to “the merely
important” addressed to small publics (Hughes, 1942). Human interest stories revolve around mostly private issues such as family, marriage, death and other matters that are familiar to the readers’ experience and emotions.

That may have been one of the reasons that explains the gender dimension the human” story angle as part of its historical roots which Hughes refers to when investigating these kinds of stories. Indeed, starting in the 1880s, attracting female readers was increasingly important to newspaper advertisers. Editors aimed to appeal to those who wanted to read women’s news and newspapers hired women to write lighter news, with an human interest angle: “Even when women did write about politics or social issues, they were encouraged to focus on how events affected people in their everyday lives and to provoke an emotional response from readers, presumably women readers” (Chambers, Steiner & Fleming, 2004). What presupposed this gendered construction of the news was an essentialist view of womanhood that largely corresponds to the prevailing emotion stereotype: women are emotional, man are not. However, what then as today, was at stake as not so much the equation of women with emotion but the gendered power to establish it as the reverse side of men’s reason.

The historical gender dimension of the production of news also found its way into contemporary journalism. As Chambers et. al (2004) remind us, during the 1990s female columnists borrowed styles and themes from women’s magazine and feature genres, producing confessional stories. As strategic forms of engaging audiences, they rested on bodily understandings of the citizen reader that were in many ways contrary to the enlightened and rational appeal made to those who needed to be properly informed for their rational decision-making processes. Thus, the value of emotions and their gendered dimensions became subject to dispute not only to news critics but also “a serious dilemma for women journalists who have been praised precisely for playing a central role or, as some argue, even leading the way, in changing news agendas and styles and modes of documenting events by ‘humanizing’ the news” (Chambers et al., 2004, p. 193).

Both in historical and present times, human interest stories have captured ordinary people’s experiences and in focusing on the private, they resonated with readers’ experiences and understandings of the world and thus they gained a public character:

by relating occurrences in terms of private feeling, the reporter takes them [the readers] out of the busy realm of affairs. He diverts attention from practical implications, and the reader digests and appreciates the event as someone’s
experience, and the story of it as an end in itself, written for his entertainment like the little human-interest stories. Yet the process is never quite complete; since the happening concerns named persons and places and is recognized as having actually occurred, many readers will take it seriously. (Hughes, 1942, p. 15)

Discussing Hughes’s work, Daniel Kaplan also stresses her belief in the function of human interest stories through which “readers can learn about others like themselves and feel some sympathy and solidarity with others in an otherwise impersonal, disinterested world” (Kaplan, 1981, p. xiii). Likewise, in a review of the literatures on the genre, Judy Polumbaum reminds us that Hughes portrayed human interest in journalism primarily as a distraction from matters of public consequence but “other analysts regard human interest as a double-edged sword that can either dilute or strengthen attention to consequential issues” and that at “its best, however, human interest journalism can generate awareness of important social issues and problems, bring valuable new voices into crucial public debates, and promote popular involvement in civic affairs (Polumbaum, 2009, pp. 731-732).

This argument is not very different from what some research indicates when considering other closely associated terms such as “tabloidization”. Indeed as Colin Sparks (2000) noted, although researching mostly the origins of the mass press, Helen McGill Hughes anticipated the contemporary debate about the so-called “tabloid journalism”.

Tragedy, as we have seen, is a rich element of the social fabric that provides constant occasions to produce human interest narratives. It also the perfect motive to captivate media audiences, namely by seeking out their voyeuristic interests and establishing prolonged or episodic emotional states of feelings such as chock, pity or disbelief. In doing this, new media follow the trend of many other media products which base their appeal in emotions and the pleasures gained from mediated experience of witnessing personal experiences. This is not just the case of the confessional talk “shows or the ever” surprising reality shows on TV but also of the many social media that require the voluntary revelation of intimate experiences and feelings, as well as the different manifestations of the trend towards the personalization of politics and social life. “Tabloidization”, Sparks (2000) argues, has extended from its historical format of human story narratives of popular press to become part of the larger processes that are changing the more serious media towards approaching the popular formats.

Indeed, recalling our introductory news piece published in a “quality paper”, we may establish its mainly episodic and private character as
differing considerably from the detached and “objective” style of news. Also, the issue of domestic violence is “buried” down in the narrative, as emotions surface and become the main frame. Thus, as a narrative that seeks “to stimulate senses and arouse curiosity, interest or emotional response in viewers” (Grabe, Zhou & Barnett, 2001) it could be sided with a “sensationalist” or “tabloid style” piece of news that opposes the most serious and “important” news. Indeed, many would argue that this kind of focus on story attributes aimed at triggering emotional responses in audiences is a deliberate strategy to capture higher audience shares which is simply explained by the political economy of the media and has little to do with the seriousness of social and political life.

However, others would say that these narratives are important as they become personally important and in doing so, they can promote better audience engagement. Uribe and Gunter (2007, p. 222), for example, argue that “(these) features in news may not only be a response to external market pressures but could also be related to a motivation on the part of news professionals to produce more engaging coverage of those issues that are relevant for the public debate” (see also for example Costera Meijer, 2001; Langer, 1998; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2008).

Before we move to what underlines this dilemma and suggest possible ways to move beyond it, we should consider the issue of emotions themselves.

3. Emotions in (gendered) social life

In media, as well as in broader society, the focus on emotions seems to be at odds with other prevailing believes on the value of detachment and reason as key to an ethical public sphere that informs rational citizens. As Deborah Lupton (1998, p. 3) explains,

because the emotions are viewed as embodied sensations, they are considered to be the antithesis of reason and rationality. From this perspective, the emotions are impediments to proper (considered) judgment and intellectual activity. Emotional expression has also traditionally been associated with ‘uncivilized’ behavior, with vulgarity and the lower orders.

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2 Indeed, as Elisabeth Bird has put it, “Tabloid style has come to be understood as a particular kind of formulaic, colorful narrative related to, but usually perceived as distinct from standard, “objective” styles of journalism. The tabloid style is consistently seen by critics as inferior, appealing to base instincts and public demand for sensationalism” (Bird, 2009, p. 49).
Philosophers have long debated the question. For David Hume, for instance, passions are immediate results of life, part of the direct manifestations of living human beings. We have to shift the ethical world of rationality to the realm of emotions. The reason by itself is unable to move to man. It can establish how needs can be fulfilled but cannot move people to action: only passions can set the will in motion. Reason is altogether dependent on pre “existing emotions that furnish motivational force. “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume, 1978 [1739], p. 415) is David Hume’s fundamental claim against the ideas that practical reason alone cannot give rise to moral motivation. His understanding of passions included some benign ones such as sympathy, which is involved in moral assessment. Our moral judgments are best understood as results of sentiment or feeling, acquired when we take up a “common point of view” (Cohon, 2008) and this common point of view involves sympathy (as distinct from pity). He argued that “no quality of human nature is more remarkable, both on itself and its consequences, than the propensity we have to sympathize with others and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own” (Hume, 1978 [1739], p. 316). Through sympathy men are able to go beyond their own emotions.

Kant, on the other hand, criticizes Hume’s view that reason cannot ground the will and can only guide it by serving passion. Instead, he grounds morality in practical reason and he sees duty, independently of emotion, as morally binding all rational agents to act.

The same dichotomy of emotion and cognition which, as we saw, stretches back to conceptions of ‘Enlightenment modernity’ is also the basis of the historical links between emotions and gender. Aristotle, for instance, said that “Woman is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears. At the same time she is more jealous, more quarrelsome, more apt to scold and to strike. She is, furthermore, more prone to despondency and less hopeful than men (…) more void of shame or self respect, more false of speech, more deceptive and of more retentive memory” (cited in Brownmiller, 1984, pp. 207-208). This portrayal of women as lead by emotions continued into the early modern world and later took many

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3 More recently Michael Slote (2007) followed the insights of moral sentimentalists such as David Hume and emphasised that empathy, in particular, is central to in his consideration of moral issues which he views in terms of emotionally involved caring and connection to others. Moreover, “the notion of empathy helps us to integrate both autonomy and respect for autonomy into a comprehensive ethics of care” (Slote, 2007, p. 67).
other forms within family or public life. Simone de Beauvoir would show how this ancient *dualism* between *mind* and *body* was mapped onto the division of the sexes in a way that defined women as “The Other” to men. Men were defined as rational actors and women as closer to nature and inherently emotional, thus requiring control. Indeed, the dichotomy that constructs women as emotional and men as rational is a hierarchy that insists that reason should govern emotion and the “logical” conclusion from this is that men are supposed to govern women. Since de Beauvoir groundbreaking work, other feminists would work to show the cultural natural of construction of the idea of ‘emotion’ itself as tied to essentialist notions of womanhood (Lutz, 1996).

In the social sciences, sociology was late in in recognizing how important emotions are in understanding the social world (Stets & Turner, 2007). It was not before the mid-1970s that sociological writing stated focusing upon emotions, namely in the work of Theodore D. Kemper (1978) and others such as C. Wright Mills, George Homans, Richard Sennett and Alvin Gouldner. This tied up to (or helped to shape) the broader move to challenge the dichotomy between reason and emotion and increasingly philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists have pointed out that emotions are not only crucial to social life (Barbalet, 2002) but play an extremely important role in decision-making. And in recent years, emotions found new allies such as affect, identity, reflexivity and individualization. This ‘affective turn’ (Clough & Halley, 2007) in contemporary social theorizing can be seen as part of a broader shift in the understanding of ‘the social’ (Greco & Stenner, 2008).

Also, since the 1960s we have seen a steady increase of theoretical and empirical work under the rubric of ‘media and emotions’ of which a large part sees the media as causes of emotions (Demertzis, 2011). Often, says Chris Peters, views are based on an undertheorized conceptualization of emotion, conflated with tabloid practices, sensationalism and commercialization (Peters, 2011). In fact, he argues, instead of treating emotion dismissively, we should look into emotions from a sociological conception (in his view as the experience of involvement). Once again, part of this inquiry will be the research into the gender dimension of emotions. As Peters notes:

If one were to closely examine the rise in popularity of the morning news shows, for instance, one might find that an aspect of their success hinges on crafting a stereotypically ‘feminine’ style of involvement – more sensitive, jovial, and conversational – precisely because this genre of news
is temporally aligned with the private maternal sphere of the home. (Peters, 2011, p. 310)

Researching how emotions have been dealt with by media scholars and concentrating in particular on the mediatization of trauma Demertzis himself concludes that “a lot remains to be done towards the analysis of media morality in view of the forthcoming bridging between the sociology of emotions, media psychology, and media ethics” (Demertzis, 2011, p. 95). In an attempt to further one of those connections – the one between emotions and media ethics – we look now into how emotions can establish ethical social links in line with different challenges to the value “free model of decision making implied in the Kantian” inspired ethics. This is the model, as we have seen, by which journalists are exhorted leave their own emotions and in fact any personal believes out of the news, even if emotion is allowed as an effect on the audience perception of covered people and facts.

4. Emotions and the Pragmatic Challenge to Dispassionate Ethics

The challenge to ‘dispassionate’ ethics can also be traced back to the origins of North American pragmatism, which coincided with the Progressive Era. There, we find John Dewey and a host of female thinkers who valued emotions and appreciated them as part of our relational capabilities. For Dewey, the affective is not peripheral to reason or a sub product of ethical life. He writes:

The conclusion is not that the emotional, passionate phase of action can be or should be eliminated in behalf of a bloodless reason. More ‘passions’, not fewer, is the answer. To check the influence of hate there must be sympathy, while to rationalize sympathy there are needed emotions of curiosity, caution, respect for the freedom of others (...). Rationality, once more, is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires. “Reason” as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions (...). (Dewey, 1922, pp. 195-196)

In his writings we find a nuanced concept of intelligence in which the affective is crucial to moral inquiry and to a good moral character. As noted by Gregory Pappas (Pappas, 1993, p. 83) he “does not rule out any emotion as morally irrelevant, but he gives reasons why sympathy is the most
important affection for moral inquiry and a good character”. With the help of empathy we can get closer to an intellectual point of view, which may be useful for moral deliberation. Putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes emotionally is the only way to expand our horizon and determine effectively what others need and value. The organic interaction between emotions and the other virtues of character expands our conception of ethics into the social, as for Dewey, morality is “social” insofar as interaction is a primary fact of everyday moral experience. For him, emotion is public, not private (Seigfried, 1996).

In 1930 John Dewey would also predict that “the growing freedom of women can hardly have any other outcome than the production of more realistic and more human morals” (Dewey, 1984 [1930], p. 276). Here, he acknowledges women’s contribution to ethics in terms of common humanity rather than sentimentality or separate spheres (Seigfried, 1996). Yet, contemporary liberal communicative ethics is still guided by a strict focus on reason which does not deal well with their importance to moral judgment as part of our common humanity and human life. As we have seen, this also extends to traditional Kantian news deontology.

Dewey would certainly have based his views and criticism of the universalistic assumptions of traditional ethics on early Chicago pragmatic feminists who also valued emotions, opposing the individualistic nature of justice (Seigfried, 1996). Indeed, care, sympathy and empathy were no strangers to women pragmatists such as Jane Addams who argued that the conditions of interdependence held the promise of civilization, cooperation and coexistence and was closely tied up to democracy. In her words, “To follow the path of social morality... implies that diversified human experience and resultant sympathy which are the foundation and guarantee of Democracy” (Addams, 1907, p. 7). She and a range of other women, worked to build communities that promoted these associations and found room for care based on a pragmatic view of sympathy and feeling. Through interdependence, as a condition of community, she and other pragmatist women recognized and acted upon communal obligations through varied actions, such as being garbage officials, producing research on sanitation, on tuberculosis, on infant mortality or the use of cocaine in Chicago, causing changes in laws and public programs, or engaging personally in helping in childbirth. Addams continually used terms such as “warmth of heart and sympathy” or “human love and sympathy” in association with an ethical form of caring (Anderson, 2004).
5. Feminist ethics and care

The kind of social ethics of sympathetic understanding that Addams describes in *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1907) build upon the modern notion of an ethics of care though which feminist scholarship has more recently discussed the importance of relationships and personal emotional experiences to cultural and political meanings. Care ethics in particular recognizes the moral value of feelings and emotion-based virtues such as empathy and sensitivity. In the 1980’s Carol Gilligan (1982) and Nel Noddings (1984) did influential work with a focus on the context of the situation versus impartial deliberation, arguing that ethics should be concerned with how people care about others with whom they have social relationships, not with abstract notions about rights and consequences. They established that the predominant emphasis of ethics must be on caring as a particular sort of substantive moral concern that everyone needs in order to survive and live a good life. When deciding how to act, moral agents need not attend to universal, impartial moral principles but be concerned with others in a contextual way.

Joan Tronto (1987, p. 660) noted the dangers of conservatism in care ethics and posited that “feminists should no longer celebrate an ethic of care as a factor of gender difference that points to women’s superiority”. Instead, she differentiated between obligation-based ethics and responsibility-based ethics, the latter postulating that the relationship with others must be the starting point (1993). She offered different phases of care that are analytically separate but interconnected in the ongoing process of care: care about someone or something, as openness to acknowledge the need of the other person; caregiving, as a technical and moral skill; care receiving, as the capacity for self-assessment and to react to the way others receive our care. Bringing her work to the field of journalism ethics, Carlos Camponez said that an ethical journalism requires sensitive professionals concerned about the world around them (care about), competent professionals when addressing public issues (care giving), and professionals concerned for their trade and actively committed to self-regulation, while enjoying the protection of social institutions and law (care receiving). (Camponez, 2014, pp. 132-133)

For Virginia Held’s view too, a comprehensive moral theory will have to include the insights of both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice.

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4 For a useful overview of Care Ethics see Marilyn Friedman (2013).
Care ethics starts from the compelling moral sense that we should attend to the needs of those for whom we take responsibility and “stresses the moral force of the responsibility to respond to the needs of the dependent” (Held, 2006, p. 10). In doing so, care values moral emotions such as “sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness,” and even “anger may be a component of the moral indignation that should be felt when people are treated unjustly or inhumanely” (Held, 2006).

This commitment to responsibility that does not necessarily exclude emotions may be the key to journalism’s dilemmas was we saw above. And it is in light of its many contributions that Linda Steiner (Steiner, 2009, 2014; Steiner & Okrusch, 2006) has insisted that there is much to be gained from looking into feminist care ethics when considering journalism.

Media traditional ethics are based on the disembodied Kantian deontological ideal of the wholly autonomous rational agents which specifically takes the form of an the idea of the journalist as a dispassionate and objective agent, acting only under rationally derived principles and as a distant and professional observer. Under its principles, the reporter uses his professional ideals of impartial and distant observation to maintain the separation of whatever and whoever he/she reports on. Thus, in journalism practice there is a clear tendency to cultivate the traditional, simplistic and acritical assumption that emotion compromises rationality and undermines impartiality. Yet, as research shows, binary oppositions between objectivity and subjectivity and emotionality and rationality are overly simplistic and obscure the complexities of journalistic storytelling (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013).

In their review of care ethics as a potential view applied to journalism, Steiner and Okrusch (2006) conclude that caring must be specifically politicized to embrace strangers and communities of differential pull—in relationship not only to their known and ‘seen’ sources and subjects, but also their audiences, whom they do not know individually. It must address structural and institutional problems and abuses.

For them, care ethics offers journalists an alternative framework for moral decision-making: “Applying a revitalized care ethics may save public journalism from some of its empirical, conceptual, and rhetorical weaknesses” (Steiner & Okrusch, 2006, p. 117). Pech and Leibel (2006, p. 153) question the distinction between the work of journalism and the event being reported on and argue that from “a care perspective, reportable events are understood from the point of view of their promotion of or devaluation of our solidarity with others”.

(Held, 2006, p. 16).
Vanacker and Breslin (2006) too applied care ethics to journalism considering that a care-based approach can enrich and diversify media ethics both from a theoretical and practical perspective. In practical terms, it can for example provide specific guidelines for the coverage of crime stories and crime victims. In our own research we looked into professional’s views of their ethical principles to see how these views were compatible with the notion of care ethics, namely as advanced by Joan Tronto (Silveirinha, Simões & Camponez, 2014).

Looking back at our initial news-story, we can now read it beyond the view of emotions as elements of degrading news quality. They may be so, but only when they do not serve the purpose of informing us of our daily life in a way that cares both for the people and issues that it covers and for its audiences.

We recall our exemplary news piece as one that was framed as story about the “the son” and his father. In establishing this angle, a woman’s murder becomes simply the background to the feelings and actions of the perpetrator and his son and the woman victim is erased from it. Surely, we can be moved by the angst and the chock of the groom, but in the narrative, the murdered woman does not count: she no longer acts or feels and, what’s more, her past actions or feelings are presented in a way that may justify that she may have been the very cause of her own death. The news story, in other words, does not care for the victim. Also, since this victim has suffered from the persistent serious issue of violence against women of our contemporary societies, the problem is related to a second plan at best. This shows that we can be captivated by an interesting narrative but are done an enormous disservice when we are presented with careless reporting. As our simple example shows is that this disservice happens when what is left out is a crucial issue “such as an act of violence against women” that rationally affects our relationships and our very way of living.

6. Closing notes: emotions and the ethical construction of news

In evaluating the potentials and pitfalls of tabloid journalism, Elizabeth Bird (2009, p. 49) suggested that “It seems journalism may have two choices. It can accept that its claim to truth is no better or worse than anyone else’s, cling onto traditional notions of objectivity, and continue a struggle to survive in a relativistic, cynical world in which whatever sells leads. Or it can try to develop new ways of doing business, that involve a renewed commitment to actually doing journalism, and perhaps a rethinking of objectivity”.

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As part of these news ways, it’s time to look into news ways of combining the long’ standing beliefs in objective journalism with more nuanced understandings of how journalists deal with their news subjects and issues. Dewey has taught us that as individuals and as a society we need to ‘educate our emotions’ so as not be controlled by them; we need to learn to integrate our emotions and reasoning faculties to reach more satisfying levels of experience and more democratic forms of community. On this view, our emotions and values are essential components of good reasoning and inquiry. They are part of what makes us aware of social life and makes move to action. They are also part of good communal deliberation about issues. However, we cannot be informed by sloppy and merely sensational news. What we need from journalists is that they do their work with a strong commitment to verification of the facts and the necessary care towards the subjects of their reporting, particularly if they are vulnerable, suffering or have been victims of others or of different kinds of circumstances.

Together with the feminist notions of care (as a concern for others) and empathy (imagining the experiences of others) as well as the idea that our capacities to communicate, listen, understand, and learn are as much affective as they are cognitive, we may be able to devise ways of educating journalists to wisely use emotions to enhance democracy.

The argument about the need to engage audiences of news is a valid and important one and it concerns both women and men. But perhaps we can do so better if the story” telling with emotion” eliciting features in news is balanced with the insight that journalists, as Linda Steiner puts it, “address underserved and otherwise unprotected audiences, even if, especially if they are not desirable markets per se” (Steiner, 2008, p. 314). Including in the many transformations that journalism is currently undergoing the insights of the many forms of feminism in journalism ideals and practices can only be a way forward towards the kind of aspirations of a fuller and more inclusive collective life upon which journalism was historically founded.

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